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Book Review
A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in
Crisis, by David Rieff
Publisher: Simon & Schuster (2002)
Price: $26.00
Reviewed by: Nick Robinson
During the 1990s, the world bore witness to a startling number of
atrocities, from the much-publicized massacres in Bosnia and the genocide
in Rwanda, to the lesser known civil wars in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and the Sudan, which themselves claimed millions. To David Rieff,
author of books such as Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West and
an experienced journalist who extensively covered Bosnia and Rwanda, the
world is a place where literally billions suffer with little reason for hope.
"Human rights" and "international community" are ideas with good
intentions, but with little substance or weight behind them. For Rieff, the
aid worker is one of the last remaining noble forces amidst this brutality.
The aid worker brings food, care, and hope to both innocent and guilty
alike in the worst of circumstances. Quoting one aid worker, Rieff defines
traditional humanitarianism as "an effort to bring a measure of humanity,
always insufficient, into situations that should not exist."'
Because he holds the principles and acts of humanitarianism in such
high regard, Rieff is deeply disturbed by the increased politicization of
humanitarianism and the military interventions undertaken in its name in
the 1990s. David Rieff's A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis is an
emotionally raw and deeply personal argument that humanitarian
organizations must be free from the constraints of the demands of donor
governments and the broader ideological concerns of the human rights or
"good governance" movements. Humanitarianism must be free to simply
aid those in need. In making this argument, the book provides a view into
the politics and subculture of humanitarian aid organizations, from the
International Red Cross (IRC) to Doctors Without Borders (MSF); it takes as
its examples the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, from Bosnia to
Afghanistan.
1 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis 178 (2002) (quoting
interview with Philip Gaillard).
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By the end of the Cold War, many in Europe, and to a lesser extent the
United States, viewed humanitarianism as "the last coherent saving ideal." 2
The almost religious belief of humanitarianism's adherents is that, despite
all the cruel evidence in the history of the world to the contrary, human
beings are not meant to suffer. However, while humanitarianism may be a
noble ideal, it lacks coherence as a moral or political system. The reality is
that aid enables a person to survive for the day, but does little to
structurally change the situation of either an individual or a nation.
Furthermore, aid organizations must constantly make deals with dictators
and thugs in order to get supplies and care to those who need it. These
deals often make bad situations worse as access to aid is used as a political
tool to bolster one side of a conflict at the expense of another.
During the 1990s, many aid workers were not satisfied with "merely"
giving aid, but wanted to politicize the context in which aid was given by
conditioning its delivery on concepts like human rights, good governance,
and nation-building. For example, in 2002, while famine loomed in
Zimbabwe, aid organizations withdrew or scaled back assistance because
of their disapproval of the ongoing human rights violations in the country.
In this withdrawal, Rieff detects a feeling amongst some aid groups that
aid should only be given to the "deserving poor" - if suffering in the short-
term produces better government, that suffering is justified by the long-
term benefit.
This view asks humanitarianism to do too much, Rieff argues, and in
the process undermines its moral authority. Relief agencies must accept
that, as former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata puts it,
"There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems." 3
Humanitarian aid should be used only to stop suffering, not to change
societies or the world. Rieff criticizes aid agencies that suggest they could
save the lives of all those in need if given enough resources. In his view,
aid agencies are not capable of changing the political institutions that
create this suffering, and they should not attempt to do so. Rieff fears that
the human rights and good governance frameworks embraced by many of
these aid agencies only create false hopes while diluting humanitarianism's
current ability to help those in need. But while he contends that aid
agencies should not condition relief on their political beliefs, Rieff thinks
they can serve as a useful tool in publicizing the horrors that they witness.
He argues that the media and the public in the West must neither
depoliticize famines or wars as simple humanitarian crises, nor turn a blind
eye to the political roots and implications of such crises.
Because they perceived clear right and wrong sides in the Bosnian
conflict, many aid workers discussed or called for military intervention
against the Serbs on humanitarian grounds. However, Rieff observes that
such a moral call for military intervention works only in certain situations:
where there is an ascertainable "right" side, political clarity, a commitment
2Id. at 120.
3 Id. at 22.
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by the Western public towards action, and a possibility of success. In
Africa, Rieff argues, such situations rarely exist.
Although Rieff is generally opposed to humanitarian military
intervention, he does not oppose other types of military intervention. For
example, he supported the use of military force in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan. However, Rieff supports intervention for political reasons,
such as supporting a struggling democracy in Bosnia or ridding
Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and the Taliban on national security grounds. The
problem with a humanitarian justification for war, Rieff argues, is that it
puts war beyond debate when war should never be beyond debate. For
example, some government leaders justified the recent wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan on humanitarian grounds, even though the actual reasons for
war were far more complex and far less altruistic. Intervention on
humanitarian grounds, he argues, can have troubling imperialistic
undertones reminiscent of certain 19th Century interventions. The
justifications for some of these "interventions," such as the abolition of
slavery in the Congo or the creation of schools and hospitals by
missionaries throughout Africa and Asia, served as pretexts under which
Western governments expanded their empires. However, Rieff argues that
military intervention is sometimes justified on strictly humanitarian
grounds, such as to stop the genocide in Rwanda, which was one of the
great horrors of this century.
Rieff is concerned that aid agencies will lose their independence as
they increasingly cooperate with Western governments. In Bosnia,
Afghanistan, and more recently in Iraq, humanitarian aid has come to be
seen by many in the military as a "force multiplier." Aid agencies in these
conflicts worked closely with and got much of their funding from Western
governments. However, by involving themselves so closely with these
Western governments, aid agencies are more likely to be attacked by forces
on the ground that see them as an arm of these governments. The bombing
of the UN Headquarters and the targeting of aid workers in Iraq may be
seen as the most recent manifestation of this phenomenon.
A Bed for the Night makes a strong claim that humanitarianism must
remain politically independent to preserve its moral weight. However, the
book fails to adequately explore many of the questions it examines. For
example, aid agencies may be philosophically compromised by their close
cooperation with Western governments, but besides security risks, the
book does not closely investigate how aid agencies have been practically
impeded by such partnerships. Rieff fears that aid agencies are losing their
independence, but does not show how their actions would be different if
they were not funded by Western governments. Indeed, it seems that these
aid agencies can help a far greater number of people through this
cooperation. Furthermore, Rieff does not clearly distinguish how this
cooperation between aid agencies and Western governments differs when
there are Western troops on the ground from when the West has no
military aspirations or plans.
It is also not clear what is new about the current "crisis" in
[Vol. 7
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humanitarianism. As Rieff points out, many of the tensions between
humanitarianism and empire-building, as well as concerns with the extent
to which humanitarian situations should be politicized, have existed since
the abolitionist and missionary movements of the 18 th and 19th centuries.
Certainly, the technologies that provide relief to and publication of these
crises have changed since then. However, how humanitarianism today
differs politically, structurally, or morally from its previous forms is not
closely examined.
A Bed for the Night was written in the wake of September 11th by an
author who had just returned from exploring the scenes of some of the
worst tragedies of the 1990s. Accordingly, Rieff writes pessimistically, yet
passionately, about the plight of the world. Although the book uses
different crises during the 1990s (Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan) as
the subject-matter of its individual chapters, it lacks overall structure and
focus. Often, the author simply repeats themes raised earlier in the book
without building upon them. Rieff's personal accounts from the ground
and the anecdotal quotes from aid workers he has interviewed are
insightful and colorful. However, the book is missing any sense of place.
Although the chapters of the book are organized by specific conflicts, one
never feels drawn into the realities of giving aid during these conflicts. The
details of the humanitarian situations are only cursorily examined. There is
conspicuously little testimony from the Afghanis or Kosovars on the
receiving end of all this aid. It as if those receiving the aid had no opinion
about what the role of humanitarianism should be.
Despite these shortcomings, Rieff's book is a welcome critique of the
claims being made upon humanitarianism today. Its general pessimism
toward the human rights movement and the future of the world is
simultaneously saddening and refreshing. Rieff's almost tragic worldview
casts needed doubt on the project of building a new world order based on
human rights norms - norms that are too often not enforced and have
limited effect even when they are. Rieff asks that we do not sacrifice
humanitarianism's independence by blindly following this potentially
dubious human rights project. Instead, in the conclusion to A Bed for the
Night, Rieff writes:
Let humanitarianism be humanitarianism. Let it save some
lives, whatever the compromises it has to make along the
way, and let it tend to the victims and remind that comer
of the world that is lucky enough not to be in agony of the
incalculable suffering, misery, and grief that literally
billions of people feel every day of their lives.
4
4 Id. at 333.
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Between Light and Shadow: The World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
International Human Rights Law, by Mac
Darrow
Publisher: Hart Publishing (2003)
Price: $80.00
Reviewed by: Horacio Javier Etchichury
Three hundred Venezuelans died in the social unrest stirred by IMF
policies in February 1989. Shortly before Argentina's default in 2001, thirty
people were killed in the social protests that shook a decade-long
neoliberal experiment. A couple of years later, Bolivian President Gonzalo
Sdnchez de Lozada was forced to flee the country in the midst of popular
uprising triggered by his audacious privatization programs.
This issue is hardly unique to South America. From every corner of the
world, a growing resistance to the policies of the IMF and the World Bank
has become increasingly visible. Every meeting of these international
financial institutions (IFIs) faces relentless protests. Many times, protestors
claim human rights should prevail over the IFIs' policies. What do human
rights concerns imply for these global governance institutions? In Between
Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
International Human Rights Law, Mac Darrow analyzes this crucial question.
The author provides a well-documented, exhaustive, and somewhat
hopeful account of the troublesome relationship between the IFIs and
human rights law. In this publication, his Ph.D. dissertation for the
University of Utrecht, Darrow provides an extensive bibliography of over
800 relevant sources and builds his carefully reasoned conclusions on more
than 125 interviews with officials, policymakers, diplomats, and experts
from the IFIs, UN organizations, NGOs, and universities in the United
States and Indonesia.
The author's main thesis is that the IFIs can and should incorporate
human rights as a core concern in their activities. Darrow offers some
moderate reform proposals for the IFIs and tries to convey a sense of hope
for their success. Here, however, the reader may feel Darrow does not
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present enough reasons to be optimistic. The shadow seems to overcome
the light.
The initial chapter describes the evolution of the IFIs since their
creation in 1944. While the World Bank initially aimed at fostering
development, the IMF supervised international monetary cooperation and
exchange stability. In the 1980s, both institutions converged in fostering
structural adjustment programs as the best way out of crisis and towards
development. Under the intrusive "conditionality" system, countries could
only take loans if they agreed to undertake some prearranged legal and
economic reforms. Yet IFIs today emphasize the need for "local
ownership." In other words, they promote a more "participatory" design
of macroeconomic policies in order to obtain a more committed attitude
from the borrower countries.
According to Darrow, the IFIs exercise today a great deal of power
"without representation or responsibility" over various domestic policies
in underdeveloped and under-represented nations.1 Rich countries, in
particular the United States, enjoy a powerful position as major funders of
the IFIs. Darrow also describes the contentious democratic legitimacy of
the IFIs, given their unequal voting system. Darrow closes the chapter by
highlighting the IFIs' selective and narrow consideration of human rights,
which is always subsidiary to the framework of an economic program.
In the next chapter, Darrow describes the impact on human rights
caused by the IFIs' policies. He states that the IFIs' have a strong, albeit not
absolute, influence on borrower countries. This influence should imply a
greater responsibility, particularly to "take a better account of human
rights factors in the spheres affected by their increasingly broad and
complex mandates." 2
Darrow begins by exploring the often-cited "positive" human rights
effect of the IFIs' activities, such as the improvement in infrastructure for
the poor, or the promotion of women's equality. Moreover, current
emphasis on "good governance" usually increases accountability in the
public sector and strengthens legal institutions.
Darrow next deals extensively with the negative side of the IFIs, which
includes their lack of legitimacy, their resort to secrecy, and their insistence
on standardized policies, which are allegedly "technical," inevitable, and
indisputable. 3 Moreover, the IFIs conceive social and economic issues
under a "compartmentalized" approach, in which macroeconomic policies
set the framework. Darrow also looks at the IFIs' uneasy closeness with
diverse authoritarian regimes.
In this chapter Darrow also analyzes the IFIs' impact in three
distressing human rights situations: Indonesia; the former Yugoslavia; and
Rwanda. In Indonesia, the IFIs failed to enforce their strict standards
regarding corruption and economic performance throughout the 1980s and
1 MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 223 (2003).
2 Id. at 112.
3 Id. at 80-83.
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1990s. Their lax attitude may have been linked to the U.S. strategic need to
keep "the right government" in Indonesia.
The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia is also connected to the IFIs.
Accelerated reforms (or "shock therapy") included the elimination of
subsidies and protections, especially minority quotas, and the re-
centralization and privatization of many facets of government. In Darrow's
opinion, these reforms destroyed a sense of security and exacerbated
internal tensions. The Rwandan genocide, according to Darrow, also relates
to previous structural adjustment policies, including the creation of a
private market for land and the imposition of fees for education.
Darrow then explores different ways to include human rights
standards in the IFIs' activities, despite the commonly cited "political
prohibition." The World Bank has this explicit restriction in its charter,
while the IMF usually infers it from its highly specialized mission. The
prohibition prevents the IFIs from taking human rights (or any other
"political" factors) into consideration. Darrow makes a persuasive case for
the inapplicability of such "prohibitions" to human rights standards and
obligations. Political neutrality does not apply in this case. There is no
neutral side regarding human rights.
Indeed, even as things stand today, the IFIs comply only in part with
the "political prohibition". On the one hand, the IFIs use the prohibition to
avoid binding human rights standards. On the other hand, the IFIs
embrace clearly political concepts, some of them closely related to human
rights. For instance, the World Bank promotes "good governance" and
freedom of the press. It also stresses the need for "empowerment" of the
poor and "accountability" of local institutions. Other human rights-based
policies embraced by the World Bank deal with the environment and the
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. The IMF, in turn, promotes
the fight against corruption. Therefore, a clear double-standard appears in
the IFIs' attitude toward "political" issues. Darrow concludes that the
inclusion of the human rights paradigm is legally admissible under the
existing mandates, as long as that paradigm is construed in light of the
institutions' objectives under current circumstances.
The next chapter describes some cultural and institutional barriers to
the integration of human rights into the IFIs' basic approach. For instance,
the World Bank's "approval culture" emphasizes loan approval over the
proper implementation of projects. Usually, any negative impact on human
rights goes unnoticed.
Moreover, the technocratic structure of the Bank prizes economic
expertise and concentrates on commodities, rather than people. In this
context, the integration of human rights into the IFIs' practices faces a
difficult challenge.
In the final chapter, Darrow proposes a set of structural reforms to
improve transparency, democratization, and accountability. Darrow
advocates a transformation of voting systems, though not to the point of
strictly equal voting rights. He also promotes a closer scrutiny of project
implementation, an increased public access to internal reports, and the
[Vol. 7
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inclusion in the design process of those affected by the projects.
Participation, Darrow notes, is still a "dead letter,"4 and its implementation
has strong human rights implications, including the provision of social
rights as preconditions for participation.
Non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, have increased
their involvement in the IFIs' activities. Here, however, Darrow introduces
a note of caution. This process, he argues, may eventually increase the
influence of the United States, since many transnational NGOs raise their
funds and train their staff in this country.
Darrow offers some possible applications of human rights standards
for IFIs. Economic, social, and cultural rights, in particular, provide several
guidelines, including the non-retrogression principle. In other words, the
IFIs cannot propose the reduction of existing protections to those social
rights. For instance, the World Bank could not advise the imposition of fees
in countries with a free public school system.
Instead, Darrow argues for the "prioritization" of human rights,
concluding that these rights are not "trumps" in the game of
policymaking.5 Here the reader may wonder whether "prioritization" may
quickly lead to trade-offs. Usually, this exchange takes place under
dubious conditions of equality between IFIs and borrower countries.
A sense of moderation permeates the final sections of the book. Darrow
limits his reform agenda to what "may realistically be achievable," though
he also claims this position is not an "endorsement of the status quo."6 He
believes in a shared effort to promote human rights by both internal and
external advocates. In other words, he tries to give his readers a sense of
hope, though a moderate one. After all, the author is an official for the UN
High Commissioner of Human Rights. He wants to see some light.
However, the hope may be difficult to share. The account of the IFIs'
shadowy record in the opening chapters offers many reasons for hesitation.
Darrow makes an excellent case for the legal admission of human rights
standards in the IFIs' activities, yet it is not clear why the IFIs would want
to embrace that paradigm. After all, the enduring resistance from many
corners of the world has been highly visible and vociferous. The IFIs'
insistence on formal obstacles reveals a deep, fundamental reluctance to
abide by human rights without reservations.
4 Id. at 256.
5 Id. at 270-71.
6 Id. at 298-99.
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Blood, Land and Sex: Legal and Political
Pluralism in Eritrea, by Lyda Favali and Roy
Pateman
Publisher: Indiana University Press (2003)
Price: $54.95
Reviewed by: Bijal Shah
In their ethnography Blood, Land and Sex: Legal and Political Pluralism in
Eritrea, Lyda Favali and Roy Pateman attempt to fashion an analysis of
legal pluralism and its feasibility in practice. They endeavor, through a
discussion of Eritrea, to craft solutions integrating domestic and
indigenous policy.
The highlight of their work, however, is their Tigrinya- and Sari'al-
flavored foray into the customary Eritrean codes of blood feud and
vengeance, land dispute, and gender relations. Favali and Pateman may
not offer many clearly workable ideas for the peaceful political
collaboration of international actors, transnational and state governments,
tradition, and religion; but they have succeeded in producing a vivid,
enjoyable text that details a complex variation of traditional rules within
the "ethnies" (nationalities) of Eritrea.
Published following the fresh inking of the 2002 Ethiopia-Eritrea
Boundary Commission agreement, the ethnography turns towards the
almost welcome post-war problems of a liberated Eritrea. It revitalizes the
topic by succeeding as one of few works in the genre that focuses not on
current intercontinental Eastern African conflict, but on Eritrea exclusively.
However, this supportive account of the new codes, the idealized
constitution of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), and the
structural and organizational concerns of the nation's fledgling judiciary
and legal academic community, provides no concrete conclusions about
the facilitation of potential change inside or beyond Eritrean borders.
The book's main focus, however, falls on the history and current
application of the indigenous law of the highland and lowland peoples of
Eritrea. These ethnic groups include the sedentary Tigrinya and the
1 Sari'a is an Eritrean variant on Shari'a, a set of ritual laws derived from Islam.
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nomadic Saho, whose tenuous relations with pastoral lands and each other
formed a foundation for land tenure and dispute resolution; the Kunama
and the Nara, whose granting of immense sexual freedoms to married
women ran counter to not only the rest of Eritrea and Africa, but much of
the "westernized" world; and the Akele Guzai, whose oldest codes
elegantly specified a sum of money for the conciliation of conflicts arising
from murder.
The book begins by identifying the diverse Eritrean ethnies, and
progresses into an exploration of the various powers and nations that have
invaded and annexed them. The book outlines the ebb and surge of
colonial and post-colonial manipulations of "traditional" law, including
those of the Italian territorialists between 1886 and 1941 (whose influence
on the nationalization of Eritrean land endures) and the vilified Ethiopians.
Further, it seeks to disentangle the numerous levels of international,
transnational, and state-level control over individuals and ethnies. It
analyzes the Eritrean legal structure under a rubric of pluralism and
synergy, and includes social, military, ideological and economic
perspectives on power over the individual and nation-state.
While the book aspires to an intricate survey of Eritrean legal
pluralism, in execution, it presents a rather simplified narrative of the
ethnies' traditional laws, prefaced by some history and unevenly padded
by unsophisticated analyses of the influences of state government,
international businesses and transnational interest groups. There is little
discussion of the role of individuals in this dynamic, nor any examination
of their viewpoints. The study of external pressures concludes, without
sufficient investigation, that rapacious investors have injured Eritrea and
that the country requires a glamorous veneer to curry economic favor with
the rest of the world.
By assuming that many of the "liberalizing" movements at work in
Eritrea are undertaken as concessions to the developed world, the authors
overlook the progressive nuances of traditional Eritrean law. The authors
claim, for instance, that the only reason Eritrea appears to be equalizing
gender rights is to impress the international community. This observation
ignores a variety of traditional practices that seem to assume an equality of
the sexes. The pluralistic legal interplay around gender norms is more
complex than the authors let on, and international pressure is but one of
many competing forces in the dynamic.
Many Eritrean customs, for instance, place particular value on land
and the conciliation of blood feuds, resulting in a dynamic that pulls
women and men into matched responsibilities. 2 But the effects of Islam
limit gender equality and contribute to women's inability to participate in
the updating of law. An old Tigrinya proverb declares that "property
should be defended, women should fight for it too, and even an inch shall
never be surrendered." But as matrimony falls under Sari'a, a wife's access
2 While certain Eritrean traditions regarding land and blood feuds treat men and women
as equal, female genital mutilation (FGM) persists as a widespread practice.
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to land is more heavily restricted than that of a single woman or widow.
On occasion, women may be killed just as honorably as men in procedures
of blood retribution. But often a female relative of the murderer is married
to a male relation of the victim to resolve a dispute. This custom cemented
the position of women as tools of negotiation for the important protection
of land and kin. Also, while some ethnie traditions that demand the
sacrifice of life to reconcile blood feuds value the lives of women as much
as those of men, Sari'a dictates that a woman's life is worth only half.
The authors note that the Eritrean codes, which codify native practices
and were nearly deemed a "masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage
of humanity" by UNESCO, do not directly discuss FGM.3 In addition, the
Land Commission, a relic of Dergue rule, has recently attempted to grant
usufructuary rights to housing and farming land to Eritreans equally,
regardless of sex, belief, race, or clan. But the authors of Blood, Land and Sex
imply, despite apparent remnants of matrilineal societies within the nation,
that the primary purpose of such developments is to elevate Eritrea in the
eyes of Western countries, not to establish or authenticate purely Eritrean
principles.
The authors also note a movement in Eritrean law toward individual
rights rather than group rights, and similarly attribute this phenomenon to
external pressures. But many indigenous practices reflect a historic
emphasis on, or at least an understanding of, individual rights. One
example is the attitude of many ethnies toward outsiders. Within both
indigenous law and current national policy, strangers are welcome and
treasured. Often, the murder of a foreigner or guest is treated more harshly
than others in blood feud conciliation. Also, the Coptic Church, whose Old
Testament is more individualist than traditional kinship laws, is little
mentioned in the book, despite its status in the lives of Tigrinya Christians.
Even under Sari'a law, the individual is afforded personal protection.
Within blood feud, Islam allows reprisal against only the killer himself,
unlike the many established ethnie systems where any member of
comparable age within the murderer's family may be sacrificed to make
peace. Despite the prevalence of certain Eritrean practices that prioritize
the rights of the individual, Favali and Pateman hint that the modern
Eritrean campaign to enhance individual rights must come from without
and not from within.
Another shortcoming of the text is that it defines Eritrean indigenous
law inconsistently, in that the authors fuse religious, traditional (pre-
colonial), and customary (colonial) law. This conflation is perhaps a result
of the authors' over-reliance on written history-sparse and superficial
compared to the larger oral body of Eritrean law-to trace the origins of
vast local policy. But customary law, traditional law, and religious
command are distinct. They operate as competing influences upon Eritrean
legal procedure, and may discretely influence one another. One example of
3 While the authors might regard this as an advancement in women's rights, it is likely
that the omission occurs because of the documentation of FGM's widespread practice.
Codification of such an ingrained, intuitive norm would be redundant.
[Vol. 7
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the interplay of customary and religious laws is the attitude of various
ethnies toward followers of Sari'a. Depending on ethnie-specific practice,
followers of Sari'a can be either a sublimated class or a dominant
community voice. In some contexts, they are rendered as politically
powerless as women, and made into invalid witnesses to blood feuds. But
sometimes, even in the same communities, they wield considerable
authority, and are major regulators of the Eritrean institution of marriage.
In addition, customary and traditional law may differ fundamentally in
their translation and implementation of decisional processes. One such
distinction is the extent to which traditional approaches may infuse
decisional procedures with ideas of magic. For instance, where pre-colonial
norms prevail, exile or another extreme form of punishment may be
invoked, in place of mere blood feud payment, against a murderer who has
used magic.
Blood, Land, and Sex does not adequately articulate the way in which
the mixture of active authorities combine into the legal pluralism presently
found in Eritrea. The writers, who hold an implicit pride in native Eritrean
ways, imply that the only reason Eritrea should adhere to international
standards for human rights is to manufacture a pretense of maturity in the
global arena. This approach prevents the authors from outlining complex
and realistic conclusions - if they draw any at all - about what legal
pluralism does for Eritrea. In the end, the study fails to examine any
applicable methodology of pluralism that might benefit Eritrea's own
affairs.
The authors are also vague about the interplay of state and local law in
this pluralistic mix. What practical role do national and local law and
policy play in the lives of ethnies in flux? The EPLF, formally Eritrea's
ruling group, may only accept traditional law when that law is in not in
conflict with the Front's own edict.4 But do the group's official decrees
have any bona fide effect? The authors' omission of EPLF policy damages
the credibility of their conclusions. For instance, the government
characterizes the organization of its people as a varied, decentralized, and
localized process, while the authors contend that Eritrea follows a unified
civil law pattern. This claim is made despite both evidence that seems to
support the official position, and an Eritrean emphasis on common law
traditions that do not report decisions or recognize case law as a judicial or
legislative source.
Ultimately, Blood, Land and Sex advocates a pluralistic system in a
country that, until recently, was exceedingly distorted by Ethiopia's
colonization. This condition is ignored in the work, except as simplified
within a discussion of land dispute. The authors fail to acknowledge that
the newly independent Eritrea lacks procedural resources such as lawyers,
judges, and systems for trial, all necessary for the effective creation and
application of law. These shortages may not only create gaps between
4 There remain some exceptions squarely within the domain of Islam, such as marriage
and other gender issues.
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Eritrea's legal aspirations and their implementation, but may hinder the
development of those ideals themselves.
These practical constraints will necessarily shape Eritrea's treatment of
legal issues, and must figure into any analysis of the country's decisional
processes. Transnational actors have repeatedly objected to Eritrea's
handling of concerns like capital punishment, child prostitution and FGM.
Eritrea has responded by pledging to improve, but has not made enough
progress to quiet international protest. Some may attribute the country's
failure to address these issues to an innate Eritrean resistance to certain
international norms. But it would be presumptuous to conclude from the
persistence of these problems that Eritrea's values oppose, are similar to, or
are even within the same context as those of the global community. The
absence of results may simply be a product of the country's limited
capacities to assess and apply its own standards, much less those of the
international community.
Favali and Pateman have much affection and respect for the exquisite
complexity of traditional Eritrean society, and this is apparent in their
careful presentation of many fascinating fine points of Eritrean customary
law. The authors' queries about the practical use and stability of local codes
as integral to a legally and socially pluralist Eritrean nation are compelling.
Their conclusions would be more satisfying if they could steer away from
an automatic assumption of the validity of ethnie law, and focus on the
implementation of pluralism as a way to facilitate the fulfillment of
Eritrea's current needs.
Perhaps it is simply that the subject matter of the book-blood feuds,
land disputes, and gender relations -is intrinsically broad and disjointed.
Nonetheless, the meticulous illustration of a complex Eritrean legal culture,
whose native law centers on blood, land, and sex, lends itself to global
analogy and hypotheses that the authors do not directly construct.
[Vol. 7
13
Rieff: A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Book Review
From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and
International Intervention, by David A.
Chandler
Publisher: Pluto Press (2002)
Price: $24.95
Reviewed by: Maria K. Pulzetti
What does international humanitarian law have to say about food
packages air-dropped onto minefields? This question confronted the staff
of a major human rights organization, gathered in the Empire State
Building conference room, from which several staff members had watched
two planes fly into the World Trade Center just one month earlier. There to
discuss human rights aspects of the recently-begun air campaign against
the Taliban, the human rights specialists also inquired whether the
simultaneous dropping of bombs and food aid in any way violated
international humanitarian law. What if the food boxes, refrigerator-sized
containers designed to break apart mid-fall, malfunctioned and fell whole,
injuring civilians?
David Chandler, a Lecturer in International Relations at Brunel
University in England and the author of other books on international
human rights, did not know of this meeting or surely he would have raised
it in his 2002 book From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International
Intervention. Chandler sees the campaigns in both Kosovo and Afghanistan
as illustrative of a new interventionist human rights approach to
international policy, which has developed, not between 1999 and 2001 as
the title might imply, but in the decade between the sunset of the Cold War
and the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. Chandler uses the
simultaneous dropping of food and bombs in Afghanistan as an
illustration of morally vacant compromise between international policy
makers, human rights norms, and humanitarian organizations.
In this book, Chandler examines the implications of the human rights
approach to international policy-making, especially focusing on its
theoretical and ethical limits. Chandler relies on the following sources:
statements made by state leaders and policymakers; writings of human
rights scholars and commentators such as Louis Henkin, Michael Ignatieff,
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and David Rieff; the work of major human rights and humanitarian NGOs,
including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and M~dicins sans
Frontires; press reports; and U.N. documents.
The human rights movement bridges the worlds of activism, policy-
making, political theory, and international law. This position, combined
with the urgency imbuing many human rights causes, tends to discourage
scholarly inquiry in favor of timely action. Chandler's book fills a niche by
providing a critical view, from the political left, of the role a universal
theory of human rights plays in international policy-making, specifically in
the context of military intervention. Essentially, Chandler asks both
whether a human rights advocate may ever call for military intervention,
and if so, what has happened when that human rights rationale becomes a
guiding force in an interventionist foreign policy.
Although this volume was published before the beginning of the U.S.
war against Iraq, it provides a theoretical background to the very
conundrum faced by many human rights advocates in early 2003: whether
to oppose U.S. military action in Iraq because of the White House's failure
to follow international law in launching the war, or to support the military
action because of Iraq's egregious human rights record. Assuming that
weapons of mass destruction do not factor into the equation, policy-makers
had to choose between advocating unprovoked invasion of a sovereign
state or defending an abusive regime. This catch-22 illustrates Chandler's
thesis: the consequences of an "ethical foreign policy" influenced by
human rights doctrine are problematic because human rights discourse
ought not be used to support interventionism. He sees an ethical problem
in calling for military action to protect human rights, and he sees a
subsequent problem as well -intervention leads to a hegemony of rights
enforcers that fails to empower individuals.
Chandler not only flags the "dangers of an uncritical adoption of the
human rights framework,"1 but he ultimately concludes that "the human
rights discourse is good at destroying and undermining but cannot create
stability or offer a constructive vision for the future."2 Although Chandler
reaches his conclusion through a thoughtful analysis of human rights as a
premise for international policy, ultimately his book rests on a question
posed in chapter six: Why is peace no longer a priority for human rights?
In the first three chapters of the book, Chandler chronicles the shift
from a Cold War ideological and political framework to what he terms
"ethical foreign policy" and "humanitarian militarism." Chandler recalls
Louis Henkin's coining of the phrase "the idea of our time"3 to describe
universal human rights, and agrees that the human rights framework has
indeed come to dominate foreign-policy decisions, especially since the end
of the Cold War, and has now assumed a larger political role than ever
before. At the same time, human rights and humanitarian organizations
1 DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOvO TO KABUL: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION 220 (2002).
2 Id. at 236.
3 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix (1990).
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have shifted from advocating for peace and need-based aid to advocating
for intervention and rights-based aid. Chandler uses the example of the
food airdrops over Afghanistan, occurring simultaneously with the
bombing campaign, to illustrate the new doctrine of "humanitarian
militarism." He persuasively highlights the rapid shift in the focus of
international aid groups such as Oxfam and M~dicins sans Frontires from
needs-based to rights-based aid provision. Even more troubling to him are
the calls for military intervention, especially to address the Kosovo and
Rwanda genocides, from groups such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch:
Back in 1990, few people would have imagined that,
within the decade, the international human rights
community would be advocating the military occupation
of independent countries on human rights grounds, the
establishment of long-term protectorates, or the bombing
of major European cities on a humanitarian basis. The
clamour of support for military activism in the cause of
human rights highlighted that Kosovo would, indeed, set
a precedent for action on "ethical principles" in the
future.4
Chandler's real contribution is his academic discussion of the limits of
human rights theory. Others have pointed out the rise in prominence of
human rights,5 but most of this work begins with the very starting point
that Chandler deconstructs: the idea that the adoption of human rights
rationales in policy-making will lead to more effective protection of human
rights. As he points out, "[tihe radical challenge of human rights to the
post-war international framework has been accepted in essence, with
discussion focusing on the nature of the required institutional changes and
the speed with which they are possible." 6 He claims that this results in too
"little critical consideration of the broader consequences of the
prioritization of the human rights framework." 7
Chandler does not credit the emergence of ethical foreign policy to
policymakers' emerging sense of the importance of the rights of the
disadvantaged. Rather, he sees the human rights framework as a
replacement for the Cold War ideology, arguing that governments need to
demonstrate a mission to their constituencies, and human rights provides
that mission. The result, however, is that the moral high ground of human
rights allows for a more active foreign policy. In chapter seven, Chandler
raises an important and under-discussed issue: does ethical foreign policy
simply provide a "legitimate" return of Great Power domination, in which
4 CHANDLER, supra note 1, at 16.
5 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2001);
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT (Samantha Power &
Graham Allison eds., 2000); David Rieff, A New Hierarchy of Values and Interests, 16 WORLD
POL'Y J. 28 (1999).
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only a few elite governments have the authority and political capital to
enforce rights? Chandler sees this "elitist consequence" as problematic for
relations between "elite" Western governments and non-Western states,
and for the operation of the U.N. system, which rests on the notion of
politically equal sovereign states.
In chapters four and five, Chandler applies human rights theory to
explore the problems of ethical foreign policy. He contends that the
transformation of universal human rights from moral ideals to enforceable
legal rights creates an international regime in which only certain "ruling
authorities" can enforce these rights. Civil and political rights in liberal
democracies, he argues, are rooted in individuals' claims to those rights.
Therefore, he argues, civil and political rights can develop in a democratic
model. On the other hand, human rights are rooted in the vulnerability of
oppressed groups, and therefore establishing and enforcing these rights is
left to outside ruling authorities, not to the rights-holders themselves.
Thus, the human rights project of identifying "new" rights that the rights-
holders may not have the political leverage to assert provides a space for
international intervention. Chandler's criticism of this model rests in his
concerns about state sovereignty and about certain elite states wielding too
much power in their authority to both define and protect universal human
rights.
From Kosovo to Kabul may succeed in prompting an important scholarly
dialogue about the implications of using human rights justifications in
international military intervention. Certainly, in Kosovo, Kabul, and
Baghdad, human rights advocates and policyrnakers have faced critical
issues about the role of human rights and intervention. Unexamined
adoption of human rights rationales for military intervention treads on
moral ground that may threaten the integrity of the human rights
movement. However, Chandler's ultimate conclusion-that "humanist"
rather than human rights regulation must inform policy-making -rings
false. His discomfort with using human rights goals in any international
efforts other than peace-building no longer resonates as contemporary, and
perhaps it never did; after all, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has its roots in the Second World War, and today's Western human rights
advocates inherited their movement from various Cold War activists who
supported dissidents in China and the former Soviet bloc.
Chandler's book raises important questions and succeeds in revealing
the compromised role human rights have come to play in foreign policy,
but his posing of a moral absolute-an irreconcilable conflict between
peace and human rights -leaves unanswered the vital question of how the
universal human rights framework may influence foreign policy to protect
human rights themselves. Remember those air-dropped food packets in
Afghanistan? Surely the packages did not adequately address food
shortages, and admittedly pictures of starving civilians snacking on
airlifted peanut butter served a political purpose for the Bush
administration. But some people ate. Activists' pragmatism, morally vacant
to Chandler when it takes the 'lesser-evil' approach, will not call for a halt
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to the food aid, just as a room full of experts could not find a violation of
the law in its delivery. At the intersection of activism, public policy,
political theory, and international law, human rights must be theorized
with an interdisciplinary approach.
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Land makes up three quarters of the wealth of most developing
nations and plays crucial social, customary, and religious roles. Land
reform is thus a major focus of economic development and human rights
programs. Recent popular works by writers such as Hernando de Soto
extol the virtues and apparent benefits of increased land tenure security
and suggest that the Third World can expect explosive economic growth if
property rights can be established, formalized, and protected.
The focus on formal property rights as an antecedent to economic
growth is not a recent development. In the past fifty years, citizens of
developing countries have been subjected to a flurry of land tenure reform
projects, most of them involving Western-style title registration. Though
some of these programs have apparently helped spark economic growth -
Gershon Feder's oft-cited study of Thailand is perhaps the best-known
example - many more have been disappointing at best, and counter-
productive at worst. To help explain these successes and failures, economic
and legal theorists have put forth a number of competing theories for why
land rights -"invisible," socially-constructed lines-evolve in the first
place, and why their existence can and should contribute to economic
growth and social stability.
Henri A.L. Dekker's The Invisible Line, a broad study of land policy and
theory, is a welcome addition to this critical debate. Though its breadth and
analysis make it valuable to anyone interested in property, it should be of
particular interest to development theorists, as it provides a
comprehensive, thought-provoking, and practical introduction to property
and development generally. Land policy makers around the world would
be well-served by using it as a reference.
Dekker conceives of land rights as "invisible lines" that exist
independent of topographical features. After briefly surveying the very
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visible issues of poverty, hunger, and distribution that inevitably
accompany discussions of property, Dekker devotes the bulk of his
important work to a wide-ranging but well-grounded exploration of
property, ownership, and the relationships between land, state, and
society.
The Invisible Line charts a long-overdue course between arguments
favoring formal land registration and proponents of local, customary
control. Dekker recognizes that custom is not always the problem, but also
argues that legal pluralism is not always the answer. His approach is above
all pragmatic, recognizing that land reform-whether title registration,
deed registration, or the introduction of title insurance-is a polycentric,
complex process which cannot succeed without broad participation and
wide-ranging policy reforms. Dekker stresses the need for incremental
change that takes account of existing traditional landholding. Like De Soto,
whose work has popularized the commitment to formal property rights as
a precursor to development, Dekker recognizes that political commitment
is necessary for the success of any land reform program. Land tenure
reform is no panacea. It is nonetheless an essential part of any development
program.
Moreover, Dekker rightly focuses on the perception of tenure security as
the most important factor in measuring the effects of tenure reform, rather
than the technological accuracy or advancement of the system. Many
property rights theorists err by imagining property rights as being entirely
imposed by the state and created by computerized maps, rather than being
manifested in customs and socio-economic relations. Dekker sees both
sides of the equation: that the state has a vital role and interest in land
tenure, but that wholesale, top-down property reform is unlikely to change
actual property practices. Tradition does not easily yield to new property
regimes, as the difficulties of legal reforms in Russia and throughout Africa
demonstrate. Though Dekker does not mention it specifically, the failure of
the early Law and Development movement in the United States tells a
similar cautionary tale to those who would export property solutions from
the West. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) attempted to apply Law and Development theory in the 1960s
and 1970s by grafting American business and property forms onto
development economies. The results were disappointing.
The Invisible Line's pragmatism rightfully avoids easy answers to land
reform. However, on the specific issue of deed and title registration,
Dekker seems to display an optimism that has not always proven justified
in practice. He cites Feder's study on title registration in Thailand, which
found a positive correlation between registration and economic
development, and says that registration is "highly recommendable."1
Indeed, this was the party line of the World Bank for at least three decades.
Dekker does not, however, explore the many economic and legal studies
1 HENRI A. L. DEKKER, THE INVISIBLE LINE: LAND REFORM, LAND TENURE SECURITY AND
LAND REGISTRATION 116 (2003).
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showing exactly the opposite effects in places such as Kenya, where a fifty-
year title registration program has resulted in disempowerment of tribal
groups, economic stagnation, and fragmentation of ownership. Empirical
studies attempting to establish a connection between land formalization
(drawing and recording "invisible lines") and economic growth have had
distinctly mixed results. Increasingly, development agencies -including
the World Bank-are emphasizing what Dekker himself acknowledges:
that land registration is not a silver bullet solution, and that there are a
number of prerequisites to successful registration.
Similarly, Dekker places too much emphasis on the importance of
standardization in land title registration, at the expense of local control and
variation. Land rights vary locally, not just in form, but also in content,
particularly in the many areas where land relations are still governed by
custom. Attempts to standardize are bound to fail when they do not take
into account these local variations, because landowners will continue to
follow the customary law they know. The current trend in land reform in
Africa, for example, is to focus on discovering invisible lines, rather than on
drawing them. Development agencies such as Britain's Department for
International Development (DFID), and even the World Bank (reversing its
earlier policy approach), have increasingly focused on local and even
customary control of registration. Dekker is right to say that "simplicity is
the key,"2 but simplicity and standardization are not always the same
thing.
Though Dekker recognizes that land has social value, he does not give
much attention to the specific impact that land registration and land
markets can have on certain at-risk groups. Given the breadth of his book,
this would be a near-impossible task. From a human rights perspective,
however, some people's rights to land are more "invisible" than others. In
developing countries moving from a customary method of land tenure to a
more Western method of statutory recording, for example, holders of
customary land rights often find their land rights threatened or
extinguished by well-intentioned land reform. This is especially true for
women and other 'secondary' users of land, because title registration
programs generally vest title in a single owner - often a man - who, as a
result, might have more powers of exclusion or alienation than he had
under the customary regime. Customary social sanctions, which title
registration distorts without always effectively replacing, are often the only
safety net protecting these secondary users, whose importance in both a
social and economic sense cannot be underestimated. In much of Africa,
'secondary' use, such as small-scale family farming, makes up the
backbone of the agricultural economy. Rights can be "invisible" in the way
that Dekker describes -because they exist as legal creations, and not as
topographical features-but they can also become invisible when they are
threatened or eliminated by misguided land reform. Secondary users
throughout Africa, for example, have had grazing and other access rights
2 Id. at 148.
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extinguished by title registration schemes. Economies, tribes, and nations
have suffered as a result.
Though Dekker covers an impressive amount of theoretical ground in
just 200 pages, a number of important frameworks for studying property
and development would have served as helpful foils to his discussion.
Despite introducing the concept of "institutions" on page one, Dekker does
not explore New Institutional Economics (NIE), which is currently the
dominant mode of analysis for property in a development context and
which specifically addresses the rise of property rights as a social and
economic institution. For all of its wide-ranging historical and political
analysis, The Invisible Line leaves out such fundamentally important
property rights theorists as Harold Demsetz, Douglass North, and Ronald
Coase. This exclusion might have been a necessary concession for clarity's
sake, but a brief explanation of NIE would give more structure to Dekker's
discussion of the rise of property rights.
The Invisible Line is an invaluable introduction to the theory and
practice of land tenure policy and land reform. It explains with superb
clarity the concepts and debates surrounding land, and in so doing frames
the larger debate about property and development. But from the more
unique perspective of rights and development, the reality in much of the
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Even a hyperpower such as the United States must choose carefully
which diplomatic and military tools it employs to advance its national
interests. Robert Art, Patrick Cronin, and their colleagues underscore this
foreign policy reality in their newest book, The United States and Coercive
Diplomacy. In this insightful new contribution to our understanding of U.S.
foreign policy, Art and his colleagues examine eight cases since the end of
the Cold War in which the U.S. used "coercive diplomacy" in an attempt to
advance its foreign policy. The eight cases studied, Somalia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Haiti, North Korea, China/Taiwan in 1995-96, Iraq from 1990-98,
and the U.S. campaign against terrorism from 1993-2001, are among the
most complex episodes in U.S. foreign policy of the past few decades.
Although the book is not without its faults, it remains a must-read for
students and teachers of foreign policy, as well as foreign policy advisors.
Coercive diplomacy can be defined simply as the attempt to induce a
target-usually a state, but possibly a group (e.g., a terrorist organization)
or other non-state actor - to change its objectionable behavior. This attempt
may take the form of either a threat to use force or the actual use of limited
force with a threat of further military action. Short of all-out war, this
diplomatic/political tactic is the most dangerous way to use a state's
military power, as failure leaves that the coercing state with a stark choice:
back down and lose face, or risk lives and a potentially costly military
campaign.
In some of these cases, such as Bosnia, Haiti, and certain episodes with
Iraq, the U.S. was moderately successful in persuading its adversary to
change its course of action. In most cases, however, the difficulty of
pursuing a strategy of coercive diplomacy, and its frequent failure, are
clearly evident. In the groundbreaking conclusion to his book, Robert Art
shows that in the period since 1990, a U.S. strategy of coercive diplomacy
has failed more often than it has succeeded.
Structurally, the book's case studies vary from analyses of specific
23
Rieff: A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
2004] Book Review: United States and Coercive Diplomacy 207
foreign policy episodes to collections of episodes or series of events. For
instance, the chapter on Somalia discusses both the successful use of
coercive diplomacy to compel the local warlords to permit the delivery of
food aid to the local populations and the subsequent failed attempt to
disarm the warlords and turn the operation over to United Nations troops.
In the case of Iraq, there were arguably six episodes of coercive diplomacy
from 1990-98, ranging from the attempt to persuade Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait in 1990-91 to Hussein's operations against the Kurds in 1996. The
chapter on terrorism presents three episodes in which the U.S. arguably
attempted to coerce certain groups to cease their operations by threat of
military action, including Iraq in 1993, al Qa'ida in 1998, and al
Qa'ida/Taliban in 2001. The other chapters, Bosnia from 1994-95, Kosovo
from 1998-99, North Korea in 1994, Haiti in 1994, and China in 1996, are all
self-contained episodes.
While most of the authors' analyses are intelligently presented, some of
their cases suffer from an academic parsimony that fails to capture complex
political realities of U.S. foreign policy. In the eight cases chosen for study
in this book, the United States used or attempted to use coercive diplomacy
to affect the behavior of one or more actors. But in some cases, the public
demands and threats made by U.S. policymakers were probably never
intended to succeed, and military conflict was a foregone conclusion. For
example, few policy analysts believe that any response to U.S. demands by
the Taliban in October 2001 would have prevented a U.S. attack on
Afghanistan. Similarly, it seems unlikely that any action short of military
retaliation would have satisfied American policymakers following the
embassy bombings in East Africa in August 1998. The authors refer to such
political tactics as "disingenuous" coercive diplomacy, or in other words,
not really diplomacy at all. In this way, the book underscores the extreme
difficulty of assessing U.S. foreign policy using such interesting, but
ultimately academic, approaches to synthesizing complex foreign policy
episodes.
Additionally, some of the cases in this book, particularly in the chapter
on terrorism, are only tenuous examples of coercive diplomacy because
they lack an actual diplomatic element. For example, Martha Crenshaw
classifies the 1993 U.S. military response against Iraq for Saddam Hussein's
past assassination attempt on then-President Bush as coercive diplomacy,
arguing that the attack was to persuade Hussein's regime to abandon its
support for terrorism. But this analysis diverges from the conclusions of
other prominent observers, who saw the attacks as merely a retaliatory
response. Similarly, the U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which took the form of an attack on a
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and an al Qa'ida training camp in
Afghanistan, is unconvincing as an example of coercive diplomacy, since
no demands were made prior to military action.
Despite these shortcomings, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy is
an excellent examination of some of the most challenging episodes in U.S.
foreign policy in the past fourteen years. Further work in this area might
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consider the cases of Pakistan immediately following the 9/11 attacks, U.S.
military pressure on the Sudanese government in the late 1990s, and of
course the prelude to the most recent war in Iraq. Art and his colleagues
have made a significant contribution to the study of U.S. foreign policy and
to the growing understanding of both the uses and limitations of coercive
diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy.
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Much has been written about Amy Chua's first book, World on Fire,
since its appearance in January of last year- so much in fact that additional
reviews might seem superfluous. There is a significant lacuna, however, in
the discussion generated by Chua's book, one which is also present in the
book itself. Specifically, this discourse has ignored an important way in
which free markets impact certain cultures.
World on Fire centers on the discussion of what Chua labels "market
dominant minorities." Market dominant minorities are ethnic groups
which comprise a minority of a country's population yet control a vastly
disproportionate amount of the wealth. In the Philippines today, ethnic
Chinese account for 1 to 2 percent of the population, yet "control all of the
Philippines' largest and most lucrative department store chains, major
supermarkets, and fast-food restaurants ... With one exception, all of the
Philippines' principal banks are now Chinese-controlled."' In Brazil, less
than 0.01% of the population, all of them "unmistakably white," 2 own most
of the country's land. The Tutsi, a 14 percent minority in Burundi, "control
approximately 70% of the country's wealth."3 Other instances abound.
Chua's thesis boils down to this: in countries such as these, the sudden
tandem introduction of free markets and democracy can have disastrous
consequences. Free markets and democracy-at least in the form
traditionally exported- are not the panaceae they are thought to be. Instead
of closing wealth gaps, unregulated free markets tend to enlarge them.
Accumulated wealth translates into increased bargaining power and
investment opportunities, thus favoring the further accumulation of wealth
1 AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 36-37 (2002).
2 Id at 67.
3 Idat 111.
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by those who already possess it. The impoverished masses may benefit
from some sort of trickle-down effect, but, as Chua points out, such effects
may actually increase resentment when it is realized how much more of
their country's newfound prosperity is being seized by the already well-off.
Introducing democracy into this mix -at least in the form of direct and
universal suffrage -can lead to serious problems. In countries with market
dominant minorities, democratic empowerment is often the spark that
ignites the powder keg of indignation brewed by extreme economic
disparity. The fact that this disparity occurs along conspicuous ethnic lines
heightens the tension. In countries with market dominant minorities,
opportunistic demagogues seeking office exploit this latent (and sometimes
not so latent) tension, painting the market dominant minorities as
"outsiders" who have seized the nation's wealth from its "rightful
owners." As Chua documents, the sudden empowerment of these angry
majorities tends to lead to reprisals against the markets which are seen as
reinforcing and indeed as causing the wealth disparity. Robert Mugabe's
Zimbabwe, U Nu's Burma, and post-Suharto Indonesia are all examples of
this.
Of even greater concern are those instances where democratic
empowerment has resulted in reprisals against the market dominant
minorities themselves. The genocide in Rwanda was of a market dominant
Tutsi minority by a democratically empowered Hutu majority. Gregoire
Kayibanda, one of the authors of the Hutu Manifesto, became the first
president of Rwanda, which was granted full independence in 1962.
Kayibanda stirred up the Hutu masses to kill the Tutsis, so much so that
already by December 1963, "highly organized Hutu massacres left almost
fourteen thousand Tutsis dead in the southern province of Gikongoro
alone." 4 The genocide that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, though part
of a differently complicated history, involved largely the same dynamics.
Despite all of this, Chua still believes that democracy is the form of
government that best accords with human dignity and that free markets
best facilitate economic development. Her concern is that the West is
exporting free market democracy to countries that are demographically
unprepared for it. Furthermore, these developing countries are encouraged
to adopt a form of free market democracy that no western country has
itself adopted. No western country, upon becoming independent,
immediately adopted universal suffrage-and no western country today
has the kind of laissez-faire free market that developing countries are
encouraged to adopt. Free market democracy, particularly of this kind, can
have disastrous effects on populations with certain demographic
characteristics, and Chua's aim is to make these effects part of the
deliberative process. She seeks to raise awareness on a dynamic present in
many developing countries that dramatically affects their chances of
progress. This is the great value of her work.
In view of that goal, however, there is a significant gap in World on Fire.
4 Id. at 167.
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Throughout the book, Chua discusses the place of culture in the dynamics
surrounding market dominant minorities. Chua makes many qualifications
throughout her work. One such qualification is that she does not purport to
explain how market dominant minorities come to be. Her work is not
genetic. Rather, it is descriptive and diagnostic: this is what market
dominant minorities are, and this is how free markets and democracies
affect them.
She nevertheless mentions various reasons one group might be more
economically successful than another. Perhaps the most prevalent of these
is culture. Careful not to adopt the explanation as her own, Chua at several
points relates the opinions of others to the effect that the various cultural
tendencies of a people are responsible for their economic success or failure.
"Some have suggested," Chua reports, that the extreme market dominance
of the 5% Chinese minority in Burma is attributable to "a native [Burmese]
prejudice against 'greedy' profit-seeking." 5 Commenting on Jewish
economic success in Bolivia vis-&-vis other immigrant groups, "one foreign
visitor observed in 1940" that, while Jews are typically willing to "'eke out
an existence, sleeping in their wagons under the stars ... the first care of
each German is to get an apartment. As far as the German is concerned, an
apartment must have a bath.'" 6 The market dominance of the Kikuyu, a
Kenyan minority, is attributed by one of their number to their having "'a
different attitude. [Kikuyu] like to invest and try ventures, however
small.'" 7 The Ibo, a market dominant minority in Nigeria, are "famous the
world over for being an unusually driven and enterprising 'trader'
minority,"8 and some believe Ibo society to be "unusually open and
'achievement-oriented." 9
In keeping with her purpose of explaining the effects of the interaction
of market dominant minorities with free markets and democracy, and not
the genesis of their market dominance, Chua relates such statements as the
ones above through the mouths of others. Conversely, Chua states things
matter-of-factly when discussing the effects that market dominant
minorities have on culture: "global anti-Americanism reflects not only our
market dominance, but also our military unilateralism, our foreign policy,
and our cultural 'hegemony. '" 10 Chua lists several ethnic majorities that
believe their culture is being swallowed by a market dominant minority,
but most of her discussion of this problem centers on America and its
influence as the global market dominant minority. "[G]roups all over the
world [are] fearful of the invasion of American products and
entertainment."1'
There is a deeper, more important sense in which American market
5 Id. at 29.
6 Id. at 67.
7 Id. at 106.
8 Id. at 108.
9 Id. at 109.
10 Id. at 237.
11 Id. at 238.
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dominance translates into cultural dominance, one at which Chua only
hints. Economic systems are generally understood to be value-neutral.
Consequently, any cultural effects an economic system may have are
extrinsic to the economic system itself. America's cultural dominance is a
by-product of its economic success: America is successful economically,
and as a result, American products are bought the world over. This
conception of the relation between economics and culture is the one most
prevalent in World on Fire.
At one point, however, Chua states, "'Culture' cannot simply be
treated as an inconvenient impediment to free markets. Even if it were
possible to transform every developing-world villager into a consumer
entrepreneur, it is hardly obvious that this ought to be the goal of
development policy."' 2 The idea that being a "consumer entrepreneur" has
anything to do with "culture" flies in the face of the idea that economic
systems are value-neutral. And if economic systems are not value-neutral,
but instead favor certain values over others, they are likewise bound to
favor cultures in which those values are held in greater esteem. Cultural
dominance, in other words, is not extrinsic to the economic system; cultural
dominance is embedded in the system itself.
Chua, unfortunately, does not dwell on the implications of this
statement. The rest of the page is spent discussing how leveling the
economic playing field will be a slow process, and at the top of the next
page, a new section begins: "Stakeholding: Spreading the Benefits of
Markets." Examining the values inherent in an economic system, though, is
necessary to properly determine the effect that that system is likely to have
on a given culture. Market systems, for instance, place a high premium on
efficiency and individual initiative. These, of course, are positive values.
But they are not the only positive values in the world. Finite humans,
unfortunately, can only realize so many values. And each human culture,
understood as a given group's value complex and the activities through
which that complex is expressed, necessarily chooses among, and ranks,
different values. A culture which ranks social interaction or a certain
quality or pace of life more highly than efficiency, frugality, and individual
efficiency is likely to fare worse in a market economy than a society which
favors these latter values. All of these values are positive values; no
judgment is made here as to which, if any, values have greater or lesser
worth. That is ultimately a meaningless question, not because values are
entirely subjective, but rather because we do not hold particular values in
isolation of others. Nor do abstract values have any meaning outside of the
concrete situation in which one finds oneself.
The point here is simply that values are given varying levels of
importance across cultures. Assuming the accuracy of the observations
cited earlier, the German who wants a bath in his apartment is not
necessarily imprudent, just as the Jew who "ekes out an existence" is not
necessarily greedy or overly frugal. Frugality, present quality of life, and a
12 Id. at 266.
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whole host of other positive values simply have a different ordering for the
German than for the Jew. It is not a bad thing that the Kikuyu and the Ibo
have an entrepreneurial spirit: it likely reflects certain (positive) values
held in high esteem by their communities. Nor is it bad that Kenyans and
Nigerians do not have such a spirit; the time they spend in other pursuits
likely expresses other, similarly positive values. Perhaps Arye Gelblum is
wrong that Sephardic Jews' relatively poor economic success is attributable
to their "chronic laziness and hatred for work." 13 Perhaps spending time
with family, cultivating social relations, or any number of other, positive
things are simply more important to them. To call them lazy is to assume
that their time is not finite; that is, it is to assume that a group's shared way
of life is able to express every value, and is not forced to rank them.
Cultures that do not give pride of place to efficiency and individual
initiative, then, are destined to be harmed by a market economy. Market
economies elevate certain values to a status they do not have in these
cultures. American cultural dominance has as much to do with the
emphasis of certain values as it does with the mere proliferation of certain
American products. Or rather, the proliferation of American products
causes concern because they exude our distinctly American value-complex.
McDonald's is not reviled because it physically originated in America;
McDonald's is reviled because of the values it embodies. It says that what
matters is that things be quick and cheap; that quantity is of paramount
importance; in other words, that efficiency is key. McDonald's, in other
words, embodies the values favored by a market system of economics.
McDonald's, which is quintessentially market, is despised as being
quintessentially American. The connection between these two concepts runs
deep. As Chua points out, America differs from other market dominant
minorities in that America is not a single ethnicity. Consequently, our
culture - that is, our shared way of life - does not revolve around ancestry,
religion, or any of the other things that tend to determine an ethnicity's
value complex. Economic life, rather, is what constitutes America's shared
way of life. This is nowhere evidenced more forcefully than in talk of "the
America dream." To be American means having the opportunity to acquire
wealth through hard work and personal initiative. This may seem like a
rather thin version of shared life, but it may be nalve to expect much more
from a country of immigrant groups, each of which brought with it a
distinct culture. It should not surprise us that, in a country with so many
distinct ways of life, economic life should constitute the deepest shared
level. This is especially true when that country has a market economy. As
Chua relates, the Ibo of Nigeria are immigrants, and "according to some
this experience has contributed to a stronger 'work ethic."' 14 The immigrant
experience, in other words, may foster one of the virtues most conducive to
a market economy. When everyone is an immigrant, and this virtue is one
of the more widely shared, it is understandable that the values of the
13 Id. at 216.
14 Id. at 109.
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economic sphere would become determinative of culture.
Immigrant status is still more conducive to a market system of
economics in that immigrants are freer to do things in the most efficient
way. They are not bound by the specific ways of doing things which the
native culture may have adopted, and through which they may express
certain values. Something as simple as baking may be done the way it is
because it involves certain cultural traditions. Chua recounts that
traditional Javanese bean curd makers are suffering badly because they
have failed to introduce greater efficiencies. 15 Immigrant groups are free to
produce such things in the most efficient way because the products and
processes involved are not a significant part of their way of life.
If efficiency and hard work are two virtues which immigration
uniquely fosters, America may have been uniquely predisposed to succeed
in a market economy. Whatever influence immigration may have had, the
fact remains that "the American dream" still dominates our vision of what
it means to live in America. Economic values are among our most deeply
held shared values and the most formative of American culture.
American market dominance, then, truly is cultural dominance. The
values which shape our culture are the same ones embodied in the market
economy, and when we export a market economy, we export ourselves.
When foreigners encounter a McDonald's, they encounter a whole way of
life, a whole ordering of values, different than, and often contrary to, their
own. It is this which causes the anti-Americanism Chua focuses on in the
third section of her book.
Chua, I suspect, senses this to some extent. It may be the reason she
mentions on so many occasions the possibility that a people's cultural
tendencies contribute to its market dominance, despite the fact that her
focus is on the effects of that market dominance. Ultimately, one cannot
separate discussion of effects from discussion of origins, since both are tied
to whatever values are inherent in an economic system. To say an
economic system favors certain value complexes is simply the corollary of
saying that it disfavors others.
Chua may have had good reasons for making this separation. Perhaps
an adequate defense of the position that cultural tendencies are partly
responsible for minority market dominance would have been too much to
fit into this book. Or perhaps she was concerned that such a position would
be misconstrued as racist and would consequently overshadow the rest of
the work. Or perhaps Chua simply doesn't believe that the economic
success (or lack thereof) of certain groups can be traced to cultural
predispositions. One thing is certain: anything which might have detracted
focus from the main thrust of the book ought to have been left out, because
what she has to say in World on Fire is so incredibly important.
15 Id. at 40.
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